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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-COMMISSIONS EARNED BY SALESMAN
AFTER LEAVING EMPLOY OF BROKER-RIGHT OF BROKER TO SHARE
IN SUCH CoMMISSION.-Under a contract terminable at will, defen-
dant was employed as a salesman on commission for plaintiff, a firm
of real estate brokers. Defendant had found a prospective purchaser
of a long-term lease for a bank, one of plaintiff's clients, but while
this transaction was pending, he resigned from his employment with
the plaintiffs, without disclosing to them the status of the pending
deal. Subsequently he obtained a broker's license' and continued the
negotiations. Thereafter the bank agreed to accept the terms pro-
posed by the prospective purchaser of its lease, but subsequently it
defaulted on the deal and the salesman recovered a judgment against
it for the commissions involved.2 In an action by the plaintiffs, to
impose a trust upon the proceeds of that judgment,3 the Special Term
held for the plaintiff on a finding of fraud on the part of the defen-
dant, but since the original employment of the real estate brokers
was non-exclusive, and since the transaction had not been completed
during the agency, the Appellate Division dismissed the complaint
when it found that the defendant had not acted fraudulently and had
resigned in good faith.4 On appeal, held, reversed. Plaintiff has the
right to share in such commissions as the defendant earned 5 even
though the defendant may not have been conscious of a purpose to
defraud his employers. Byrne & Bowman v. Barrett, 268 N. Y. 199,
197 N. E. 217 (1935).
'See N. Y. REAL. PROP. LAW (1922, am'd'd 1926) art. 12 A, §§440, 440(a),
442(d), 442(e), requiring a real estate broker to be duly licensed. See also
Bendell v. Domincis, 251 N. Y. 305, 167 N. E. 452 (1929).
'When a broker secures a customer who is ready, willing and able to
accept the terms announced to the agent by his principal, he is entitled to his
commissions whether the sale is consummated or not, and an arbitrary refusal
of his principal to accept his services does not deprive him of his right to
compensation. Mooney v. Elder, 56 N. Y. 238 (1874) ; Jacquin v. Boutard, 157
N. Y. 686, 51 N. E. 1091 (1898); John Reis Co. v. Zimmerli, 224 N. Y. 340,
120 N. E. 692 (1918); O'Hara v. Bronx Consumers' Ice Co., 254 N. Y. 210,
172 N. E. 472 (1930).
' Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 12Z N. E. 378
(1919). When property has been acquired under such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest,
equity converts him into a trustee. Robert Reis & Co. v. Volck, 151 App. Div.
613, 136 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dept. 1912): "The only indispensable elements
of a good cause of action to enforce such a trust are the fiduciary relation and
the use by one of the parties to it of the knowledge or the interest he acquired
through it to prevent the other from accomplishing the purpose of the
relation."
* Byrne v. Barrett, 242 App. Div. 583, 276 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dept. 1934).
* Here plaintiffs only recovered their share of the commissions, defendant
receiving the balance; but note that in the opinion of Robert Reis & Co. v.
Volck, 151 App. Div. 613. 136 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dept. 1912), Scott, J..
quotes from the opinion of Sanborn, C. J., in Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620
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RECENT DECISIONS
An agent is bound to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty
toward his principals. 6 This places upon him the active duty of full
disclosure to his employers, not simply the duty of refraining from
deceiving them. 7 Especially is this true where the agent is managing
a venture, and if he fails to make full disclosure, he may be held
liable even when there is no finding of actual fraud or bad faith.8
Further, an agent or employee may not use confidential knowledge
acquired in his employment, in competition with his principal.9 "Con-
fidential knowledge is something known only to one or a few and
kept from others." 10 One who enters into an employment impliedly
contracts not to carry confidential knowledge obtained from his
employer, into competition against him," and an agent may be
(C. C. A. 8th, 1903), 61 L. R. A. 176: "* * * the law peremptorily forbids
everyone who in a fiduciary relation has acquired information concerning, or
interest in the business or property of his correlate from using that knowledge
or interest to prevent the latter from accomplishing the purpose of the relation.
If one ignores or violates this prohibition, the law charges the interest or the
property which he acquires in this way with a trust for the benefit of the
other party to the relation, at the option of the latter, while it denies to the
former all commission or compensation for his services."
'*Selwyn v. Waller, 212 N. Y. 507, 106 N. E. 321 (1914); Visigraph Type-
writer Mfg. Co. v. Spiro Mfg. Co., 122 Misc. 852, 204 N. Y. Supp. 813 (1923) ;
Elco Shoe Mfrs. v. Sisk, 260 N. Y. 100, 183 N. E. 191 (1932). TIFFANY,
AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) 367: "The duty of the agent to exercise good faith
results from the fiduciary character of the relation. Of necessity, the principal
must repose confidence in the agent, and must rely upon his good faith and
loyalty to the interest which is committed to him."
' Munson v. Syracuse, etc., R. R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355 (1896);
Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1926); Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928), where Cardozo, C. J., says: "Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties." TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1924) §146: "It is the duty of the agent to exercise good faith and loyalty
toward the principal in the transaction of the business intrusted to him. This
requires-(c) That he shall give notice to the principal of all the facts rela-
tive to the business of the agency coming to his knowledge which may affect
the principal's interests." But see Knauss v. Gottfried Kreuger Brewing Co.,
142 N. Y. 70, 36 N. E. 867 (1894), where the court held that the agent was
not under a duty of full disclosure where the evidence clearly showed that the
agent had no discretionary powers.
'Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).
'See Little v. Gallus, 4 App. Div. 569, 38 N. Y. Supp. 487 (4th Dept.
1896), and Kammagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 66, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 678 (lst Dept. 1921), af'd, 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1923), for
further explanation of what constitutes confidential knowledge.
- Kammagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 66, 188 N. Y. Supp.
678 (1st Dept. 1921), af'd, 235 N. Y. 1, 138 N. E. 485 (1923).
"Little v. Gallus, 4 App. Div. 569. 38 N. Y. Supp. 487 (4th Dept. 1896).
Note dissenting opinion by Green and Ward. JJ., denying the implied contract
and quoting Bristol v. Equitable Life Ass. Society, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E.
506 (1892) : "Without denying that there may be property in an idea or trade
secret or system, it is obvious that its originator must himself protect it from
escape or disclosure. If it cannot be sold or negotiated, or used without a
disclosure, it would seem proper that some contract should guard or regulate
the disclosure, otherwise it must follow the law or ideas and become the
acquisition of whoever receives it."
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restrained to prevent such breach of contract and confidence. 12 Even
though the agency or employment has terminated, the agent may not
use, adversely to his former principals, such special information
acquired in the course of his employment, 13 and this is true although
the contract of employment included no covenant not to compete
after leaving the employment.
L. H. R.
TAXATION-INCOME AND ESTATE TAX-REcOUPmENT-STAT-
UTE OF LIMITATION.-Archibald H. Bull, a member of a partnership
engaged in the business of ship brokerage, died on February 13,
1920. The partnership agreement provided that in the event a part-
ner died the survivors were to continue the business for one year
subsequent to the death, and the estate should participate in the
gains or losses of the business to the same extent as the deceased
partner would if he had lived. There was included in the estate tax
return only the profit accrued prior to the partner's death. In August,
1921, the petitioner, executor of the estate, acquiesced and paid an
additional estate tax assessment representing the value of Bull's
interest in the partnership as measured by the sum received as profits
after his death. In July, 1925, the Commissioner adjudged these
very and same profits as being income to the estate and taxable as
such. The petitioner, on appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from
the proposed deficiency of income tax, asserted that the item could
not be both corpus and income of the estate. On dismissal of his
appeal on April 9, 1928,1 it was found to be too late to file a claim
for refund of overpayment of estate tax. The petitioner then paid
the income tax and in 1930 brought suit in the Court of Claims
praying that the United States credit against income tax the over-
payment of estate tax and refund the balance. On appeal from the
decision of the Court of Claims 2 holding the suit not timely insti-
tuted, held, reversed. A claim for recovery of money which is the
property of the claimant may be used by way of recoupment and is
not barred by limitations so long as the main action itself is timely.
Bull v. United States, 294 U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 695 (1935).
The case presents two novel and important questions, one
addressed to the merits of the case and the other to the bar of the
statute of limitations. The same sum of money, as evidenced by the
decedent's share of profits accrued to the date of his death, may well
be both income to the decedent and an asset of the estate. However,.
where partners contribute no capital and own no tangible property,
there is no reason to characterize the right of a living partner to his
'2McCall Co. v. Wright, 198 N. Y. 143, 91 N. E. 516 (1910).
13 People's Coat Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671, 157 N. Y. Supp.
15 (2d Dept. 1916), aff'd, 224 N. Y. 727, 121 N. E. 886 (1918).
'Bull v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 993 (1927).
2Bull v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 141 (1934).
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